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During the last few years, much research has been devoted to strategic interactions on complex
networks. In this context, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and it has
been established that imitative evolutionary dynamics lead to very different outcomes depending on
the details of the network. We here report that when one takes into account the real behavior of
people observed in the experiments, both at the mean-field level and on utterly different networks
the observed level of cooperation is the same. We thus show that when human subjects interact
in an heterogeneous mix including cooperators, defectors and moody conditional cooperators, the
structure of the population does not promote or inhibit cooperation with respect to a well mixed
population.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 89.65.-s, 89.75.-k, 64.60.Aq
In recent years, the physics of complex systems has
widened its scope by considering interacting many-
particle models where the interaction goes beyond the
usual concept of force. One such line of research that has
proven particularly interesting is evolutionary game the-
ory on graphs [1, 2], in which interaction between agents
is given by a game while their own state is described by a
strategy subject to an evolutionary process [3, 4]. A game
that has attracted a lot of attention in this respect is the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [5, 6], a model of a situation
in which cooperative actions lead to the best outcome
in social terms, but where free riders or non-cooperative
individuals can benefit the most individually. In mathe-
matical terms, this is described by a payoff matrix (en-
tries correspond to the row player’s payoffs and C and
D are respectively the cooperative and non-cooperative
actions)
C D
C 1 S
D T 0
(1)
with T > 1 (temptation to free-ride) and S < 0 (detri-
ment in cooperating when the other does not).
In a pioneering work, Nowak and May [7] showed that
the behavior observed in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
was dramatically different on a lattice than in a mean-
field approach: Indeed, on a lattice the cooperative strat-
egy was able to prevail by forming clusters of alike agents
who outcompeted defection. Subsequently, the problem
was considered in literally hundreds of papers [1], and
very many differences between structured and well-mixed
(mean-field) populations were identified, although by no
means they were always in favor of cooperation [8, 9].
In fact, it has been recently realized that this problem
is very sensitive to the details of the system [2, 10], in
particular to the type of evolutionary dynamics [11] con-
sidered. For this reason experimental input is needed in
order to reach a sound conclusion about what has been
referred to as ‘network reciprocity’.
In this Letter, we show that using the outcome from
the experimental evidence to inform theoretical models,
the behavior of agents playing a PD is the same at the
mean field level and in very different networks. To this
end, instead of considering some ad hoc imitative dynam-
ics [7, 12, 13], our players will play according to the strat-
egy recently uncovered by Grujic´ et al. [14] in the largest
experiment reported to date about the repeated spatial
PD, carried out on a lattice as in Nowak and May’s paper
[7] with parameters T = 1.43 and S = 0.
The results of the experiment were novel in several
respects. First, the population of players exhibited a
rather low level of cooperation (fraction of cooperative
actions in every round of the game in the steady state),
hereafter denoted by 〈c〉. Most important, however, was
the unraveling of the structure of the strategies. The
analysis of the actions taken by the players showed a
heterogeneous population consisting of “mostly defec-
tors” (defected with probability larger than 0.8), a few
“mostly cooperators” (cooperated with probability larger
than 0.8), and a majority of so-called moody conditional
cooperators. This last group consisted of players that
switched from cooperation to defection with probability
PDCi = 1 − d − γci = 1 − PCCi and from defection to
cooperation with probability PCDi = a+βci = 1−PDDi ,
ci being the fraction of cooperative actions in player i’s
neighborhood in the previous iteration. Conditional co-
operation, i.e., the dependency of the chosen strategy on
2the amount of cooperation received, had been reported
earlier in related experiments [15] and observed also for
the spatial repeated PD at a smaller scale [16]. The new
ingredient revealed in Grujic´ et al.’s experiment [14] was
the dependence of the behavior on the own player’s pre-
vious action, hence the reason to call them “moody”.
Recent experiments about the multiplayer repeated PD
confirm this observation [17].
To study how the newly unveiled rules influence the
emergence of cooperation in an structured population of
individuals, we first report results from numerical simu-
lations of a system made up of N = 104 individuals who
play a repeated PD game according to the experimen-
tal observations. To this end, we explored the average
level of cooperation in four different network configura-
tions: a well-mixed population in which the probability
that a player interacts with any other one is the same for
all players, a square lattice, an Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER) graph
and a Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free (SF) network. It
is worth mentioning that the dependence on the payoff
matrix only enters through the parameters describing the
players’ behavior (d, γ, a, β and the fractions of the three
types of players). Once these parameters are fixed the
payoffs do not enter anywhere in the evolution, as this is
only determined by the variables ci, the local fractions of
cooperative actions within each player’s neighborhood.
Thus there is no possibility to explore the dependence on
the payoffs because we lack a connection between them
and the behavioral parameters.
In Fig. 1 we present our most striking result. The fig-
ure represents, in a color-coded scale, the average level of
cooperation as a function of the fraction of mostly coop-
erators, ρC , and mostly defectors, ρD, for a BA network
of contacts. The same plots but for the rest of topologies
explored (lattice and ER graphs) produce indistinguish-
able results with respect to those shown in the figure. We
therefore conclude that the average level of cooperation in
the system does not depend on the underlying structure.
This means that, under the assumption that the players
follow the behavior of the experiment in [17], there is no
network reciprocity, i.e., no matter what the network of
contacts looks like, the observed level of cooperation is
the same. This latter finding is in stark contrast to most
previous results coming out from numerical simulations
of models in which many different updating rules —all
of them based upon the relative payoffs obtained by the
players— have been explored.
The previous numerical findings can be recovered us-
ing a simple mean-field approach to the problem. Let
the fractions of the three types of players be ρC , ρD and
ρX , for mostly cooperators, mostly defectors, and moody
conditional cooperators, respectively, with the obvious
constraint ρX = 1− ρD− ρC . Denoting by Pt(A) the co-
operation probability at time t for strategy A(= C,D,X)
FIG. 1: (color online) Density plot of the average level of co-
operation in the stationary state, 〈c〉, as a function of the frac-
tions of the three strategies (mostly cooperators, C, mostly
defectors, D, and moody conditional cooperators, X). The
plot corresponds to a Baraba´si-Albert network of contacts
(〈k〉 = 6), but the corresponding plot for an Erdo¨s-Renyi
graph or a regular lattice is indistinguishable from this one.
The system is made up of N = 104 players and the rest of pa-
rameters, taken from [14], are: d = 0.38, a = 0.15, γ = 0.62,
β = −0.1. The thin lines represent the mean-field estima-
tions [c.f. Eq. (5)] for 〈c〉 = 0.32, 0.44, 0.56, 0.68. They very
accurately match the contour lines of the density plot corre-
sponding to those values of 〈c〉, thus proving that the same
outcome is obtained in a complete graph (mean-field). Simu-
lation results have been averaged over 200 realizations.
of the repeated PD we have
〈c〉t = ρCP (C) + ρDP (D) + ρXPt(X), (2)
where Pt(C) = P (C) and Pt(D) = P (D) are known con-
stants [in our case P (C) = 0.8, P (D) = 0.2]. The prob-
ability of cooperation for conditional players in the next
time step can be obtained as
Pt+1(X) = (d+γ〈c〉t)Pt(X)+(a+β〈c〉t)[1−Pt(X)], (3)
where the first term in the right hand side considers the
probability that a conditional cooperator keeps playing as
a cooperator, whereas the second terms stands for the sit-
uation in which a moody conditional cooperator switched
from defection to cooperation. Asymptotically
lim
t→∞
Pt(X) = P (X), lim
t→∞
〈c〉t = 〈c〉.
From Eq. (3),
P (X) =
a+ β〈c〉
1 + a− d+ (β − γ)〈c〉 , (4)
thus (2) implies (with the replacement ρX = 1−ρC−ρD)
AρC +BρD = 1, (5)
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average cooperation level in the sta-
tionary state, 〈c〉, as a function of the density ρC of mostly co-
operators and two different values of the density ρD of mostly
defectors, for two different kinds of networks: regular lattice
(k = 8), and Baraba´si-Albert network (〈k〉 = 8). The net-
work size is N = 104 and the rest of parameters are as in
Fig. 1. Lines represent the mean-field estimations. Results
are averages over 200 realizations. The inset is a zoom that
highlights how the different curves compare.
where
A ≡ P (C)− P (X)〈c〉 − P (X) , B ≡
P (D)− P (X)
〈c〉 − P (X) , (6)
are functions of 〈c〉. From Eq. (5) it follows that the
curves of constant 〈c〉 are straight lines in the simplex.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates this fact: The straight lines
are plots of Eq. (5) for different values of 〈c〉. It can be
seen that they are parallel to the color stripes, and that
the values of 〈c〉 they correspond to accurately fit those
of the simulations. Figure 2 depicts the curve 〈c〉 vs. ρC
for two different values of ρD, as obtained from Eq. (5)
and compared to simulations. This figure illustrates the
excellent quantitative agreement between the mean-field
result and the simulation results. The match between
the analytical and numerical results is remarkable, as it
is the fact that the result does not depend on the under-
lying topology. This is the ultimate consequence of the
lack of network reciprocity: the cooperation level on any
network can be accurately modeled as if individuals were
playing in a well-mixed population.
The steady state is reached after a rather short tran-
sient, as illustrated by Figure 3. This figure compares the
approach of the cooperation level to its stationary state
as obtained iterating Eq. (3) and from numerical simula-
tions on different networks with different sizes. The ini-
tial cooperation level has been set to 〈c〉0 = 0.592, close
to the value observed in the experiment of Ref. [14]. The
transient does exhibit a weak dependence on the under-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Time evolution of the cooperation level
until the stationary state is reached. The results have been
obtained from numerical simulations on different networks
with different sizes. The Mean-Field curve is the solution of
Eq. (3). P (C) = 2/3, P (D) = 1/3, P (X; t = 0) = 1, 〈k〉 = 8,
ρD = 0.586, ρC = 0.053, d = 0.345, a = 0.224, γ = 0.64,
β = −0.072. Averages have been taken over 103 realizations.
lying topology and specially on the network size, but for
the largest simulated size (N = 104) the curves are all
very close to the mean-field prediction.
The only observable on which the topology does have
a strong effect is the payoff distribution among players.
Figure 4 shows these distributions for the three studied
topologies, and at two different times —short and long.
Smooth at short times, this distribution peaks around
certain values at long times. This reflects the fact that
payoffs depend on the number of neighbors of different
types around a given player, which yields a finite set of
values for the payoffs (the centers of the peaks). These
numbers occur with different probabilities (determining
the height of the peaks), according to the distribution
Q(k) =
∑
k≥1
(
k
kC kD
)
ρkCC ρ
kD
D ρ
kX
X p(k), (7)
where p(k) is the degree distribution of the network and
k = (kC , kD, kX), but it is understood that kX = k −
kC − kD. The standard convention is assumed that the
multinomial coefficient
(
k
kC kD
)
= 0 whenever kC < 0,
kD < 0 or kX < 0.
The approach to a stationary distribution of payoffs
exhibits a much longer transient. This is due to the fluc-
tuations in the payoffs arising from the specific actions
(cooperate or defect) taken by the players. These fluc-
tuations damp out as the accumulated payoffs approach
their asymptotic values. Thus, the peak widths shrink
proportionally to t−1/2. In fact, one can show that the
probability density for the distribution of payoffs Π for
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Distribution of the pay-off per neigh-
bor in the stationary state for different network topologies:
regular lattice (k = 8), Erdo¨s Re´nyi (〈k〉 = 8) and Baraba´si-
Albert network (〈k〉 = 8). Black and blue lines represent the
results of numerical simulations for two values of time: t = 10
(black shallow curves) and t = 104 (blue, thick line curves)
while red lines represent the theoretical estimations for the
density probabilities at t = 104, as obtained from Eq. (8).
N = 104, ρD = 0.586, ρC = 0.053, and other parameters
are as in Fig. 1. The simulation results are averages over 103
realizations.
strategy Z can be approximated as
WZ(Π) =
∑
k≥1
G
(
Π− ak(Z)µ(k),
√
tak(Z)σ(k)
)
Q(k),
(8)
where G(x, γ) ≡ (2piγ2)−1/2e−x2/2γ2 , the mean payoff
per neighbor received by a Z strategist against a cooper-
ator is
ak(Z) ≡ 1
k
{P (Z) + T [1− P (Z)]},
with k = kC+kD+kX , and the average cooperation level
in the neighborhood of the focal player and its variance
are
µ(k) ≡ kCP (C) + kDP (D) + kXP (X),
σ(k)2 ≡ kCP (C)[1 − P (C)] + kDP (D)[1− P (D)]
+kXP (X)[1− P (X)].
The approximate total payoff distribution, W (Π) =
ρCWC(Π)+ρDWD(Π)+ρXWX(Π), is compared in Fig. 4
with the results of the simulations for the longest time.
Summarizing, in this work we have shown both an-
alytically and through numerical simulations that if we
take into account the way in which humans are experi-
mentally found to behave when facing social dilemmas on
lattices, no evidence of network reciprocity is obtained.
In particular, we have argued that if the players of a Pris-
oners’ Dilemma adopt an update rule that only depends
on what they see from their neighborhood, then cooper-
ation drops to a low level —albeit nonzero— irrespective
of the underlying network. Moreover, we have shown
that the average level of cooperation obtained from sim-
ulations is very well predicted by a mean-field model,
and it is found to depend only on the fractions of dif-
ferent strategists. Additionally, we have also shown that
the underlying network of contacts does manifest itself in
the distribution of payoffs obtained by the players, and
has a slight influence on the transient behavior.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that our results
only make sense when applied to evolutionary game mod-
els aimed at mimicking human behavior in social dilem-
mas. The independence on the topology seems to reflect
the fact that humans update their actions according to a
rule that ignores relative payoffs. Interestingly, absence
of network reciprocity has also been observed in numeri-
cal simulations using best response dynamics [18], an up-
date rule widely used in economics that does not take into
account the neighbors’s payoffs. This suggests that the
result that networks do not play any role in the repeated
PD may be general for any dynamics that does not take
neighbors’ payoffs into account. We want to stress that
the same kind of models thought of in a strict biologi-
cal context are ruled by completely different mechanisms
which do take into account payoff (fitness) differences.
Therefore, in such contexts lattice reciprocity does play
its role. In any case, our results call for further exper-
iments that uncover what rules are actually governing
the behavior of players engaged in this and other social
dilemmas.
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